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Discussion of the International Water Law
Principles Dr. Elver Lays Out
By JAMES W. NACHBAUR*
Who gets what water is a large part of the general IsraeliInternational law and right-to-water based
Palestinian conflict.
approaches have not contributed to a clear consensus on what should
be done by Israelis and Palestinians. Dr. Elver writes, "Customary
international water law principles appear to be too conservative and
primitive.., especially in a region where water is scarce and
countries are not able and willing to cooperate on common
problems." Dr. Elver argues the international water law principles
relevant to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are: a consideration of
historical use of water, possession of the territory where groundwater
recharge occurs, respect for basic human needs for water, reasonable
and equitable use of water, and progress through negotiations in
good faith.
An additional relevant principle is the unequal division of costs
and benefits among unequal partners.' Partly because of unequal
division of costs and benefits among unequal partners-Pakistan got
infrastructure funding and most of the contested flows from Indiathe 1960 Indus Water Treaty between India and Pakistan succeeded
* Nachbaur is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of California, Santa Barbara in the
Donald Bren School of Environmental Science and Management. In the summer of
2003, Nachbaur worked at the French Embassy in Amman, Jordan, for the
International Water Management Institute's comprehensive assessment of the
management of medium-sized river basins around the world. This work is based on
work supported by the National Science Foundation under grant number 0114437.
E-mail: jnachbaur@bren.ucsb.edu
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Ray and her coauthors argue that the positions in the water
allocation conflict of Israel and the Palestinian Territories
respectively, are similar to the positions of India and Pakistan in their
water dispute. Unequal sharing of costs and benefits worked for
India and Pakistan and therefore may work for Israel and the
Palestinian Territories.
Dr. Elver points out four main difficulties in applying
international water law principles to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
One, the stakes are high in committing to any water management
plan, since resolution of the conflict may depend on addressing water
scarcity. Two, Israeli per capita water use far exceeds Palestinian per
capita water use. Immigrants to Israel and returning Palestinians
must somehow be reconciled with scarce water supplies. Three,
Israel politically downplays the importance of water issues. Despite
the costs, increased desalinization may be the best way to reduce the
demand for the most contested groundwater. Four, it is costly to
desalinate seawater and socially disruptive to move water away from
irrigation to other uses.
As Dr. Elver notes, the water problems in Israel and the
Palestinian Territories depend on geography, demographics, and
economics, not solely politics.
Simply addressing politics and
disputes over territory and sovereignty in Israel and the Palestinian
Territories therefore will not clear up the problem of consistently
providing affordable water to Israelis and Palestinians.
A less polarized Israel and Palestinian Territories might
resemble the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan today. There are
important differences, but Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinian
Territories are geographically close, suffer from water scarcities and
water quality problems, are subject to highly variable rainfall, lack
extensive natural resources, and have large population centers at
some distance from water sources. Even after the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict is resolved, consistent provision of affordable water in Israel
and the Palestinian Territories will be as difficult as it is now in
Jordan.
In Jordan, people pay high prices for water because of water
scarcity and water delivery costs. For example, much of the water for
Amman is pumped up a great distance from the Jordan Valley.
Scarcity of water and large transport costs similarly will keep water
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expensive in Israel and the Palestinian Territories regardless of how
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is resolved.
Throughout the area, many creative projects are underway to
make more water available to people. Even with projects that
increase water supply or water use efficiency, good water
management will be key. A joint water management plan between
Israelis and Palestinians will probably include some complex
exchanges of water and other goods, such as food, and services, such
as water quality monitoring. Two models for Israeli-Palestinian
water deals are water sharing within Jordan and the 1994 water treaty
between Israel and Jordan. That treaty:
[Hias Jordan storing winter runoff in the only major surface
reservoir in the region-the Sea of Galilee-even though that lake
happens to be in Israel; it [the treaty] has Israel leasing from Jordan
in 50-year increments wells and agricultural land on which it has
come to rely; and it creates a Joint Water Committee to manage the
shared resources. But it did not adequately describe what would
happen to the prescribed allocations in a drought.
[T]he worst drought on record caused Israel to threaten to renege
on its delivery schedule, which in turn caused protests in the streets
of Amman, personal outrage on the part of the King of Jordan,
and, according to some, threatened the very stability of peace
between the two nations before a resolution was found. Such are
the dangers of treaties which do not allow for the vagaries of
nature.3
Within Jordan, the water trades between the valley and
highlands regions also led to tension during drought. During the
recent drought, some of the water traditionally used for irrigation in
the Jordan Valley was pumped to Amman to meet urban water
demands. This pumping caused hardships for farmers and increased
tensions between irrigators and other water users. Drought is an
additional difficulty in applying international water law principles to
It is
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict beyond Dr. Elver's four.
important that any water agreement between the Israelis and the
Palestinians must include specific provisions for prolonged drought or
other water supply disruptions.

3. Arnon Medzini and Aaron T. Wolf, Towards a Middle East at Peace: Hidden
Issues in Arab-Israeli Hydropolitics, WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT 20, 203
(2004).
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A non-drought supply disruption that Israelis and Palestinians
might have to cope with might be like the situation Jordan faced in
1998. That summer, the water system in Amman could not provide
affordable drinking water to the urban poor since algae had
contaminated a main reservoir. For two weeks, the main water
supply was off and the price of water delivered by private tanker
trucks rose to more than fifteen US Dollars per cubic meter.
Emergency water reallocations between Israelis and Palestinians
would be one way to keep water prices as low as possible during
crises.
To increase water supplies, Israelis and Palestinians have the
same technological options Jordan has, but with better access to
seawater. Dr. Elver discusses these options in her paper. One option
she did not mention is that the Palestinian Territories may be able to
increase trade with Israel of food for water as Jordan imports food to
free up water from irrigation.4 Producing food mainly for trade
purposes strongly reduces a region's food security and cultural
resilience and should not be considered lightly.
How governments treat water policies, as an isolated subset of
all government policies is another difficulty in applying international
water law principles to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. According to
Ray, "environmental impact assessment and cost benefit analysis are
excellent training devices because they force researchers across
national and disciplinary boundaries to confront one another's
priorities, values, and constraints within a unified framework." 5 Even
with analysis, however, decisions treating water policies as an isolated
subset of all policies could make good water management much more
difficult.
In Jordan there are several crucial water-related issues
government water policy traditionally has not dealt with. Jordan's
very high tariffs on imported produce, especially bananas, hinder
efficient water and food management. These high tariffs are what
make farming bananas in Jordan profitable, even though a banana
crop requires lots of high-quality water per hectare. Politically
important Israeli agricultural subsidies, like the Jordanian
agricultural subsidies, constrain water management options.
In Jordan, actively assisting crop selection, farming techniques,
and marketing has not been a national water management issue. In
4. Ray, supra note 1, at 8.

5. Id. at 16.
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Jordan and the Palestinian Territories, lack of technical training will
become more important as more treated wastewater is used for
irrigation.
In Jordan, decisions about which irrigation to curtail during
droughts are highly politicized. Since the government controls the
canals in the Jordan Valley, the government easily withheld some
water from Jordan Valley farmers and pumped the water up to
Amman during the last drought. An alternative, increasing pumping
from the municipal wells in the highlands and reducing pumping from
the nearby private wells (perhaps by buying and fallowing farmland),
has been politically impossible. Well-using irrigators in the Jordan
Valley and in the highlands often see groundwater pumping
regulation as a violation of their property rights. These irrigators
tend to be politically powerful and thus make changes to national
water management difficult. Similarly, as water demands in Israel
have grown, restricting Palestinian water use has been politically
easier for Israelis than restricting Israeli irrigation. As Dr. Elver
writes, "Israeli water shortages are shifted to the Palestinian society,
which lacks the financial means for new investment and the necessary
institutions to impose good management to ensure that the best use is
made of limited water resources."'
In Israel and the Palestinian Territories, the resources
committed to violent conflict and its suppression almost certainly
exceed what building enough desalinization plants to diffuse the
It is true that pumping,
Israeli-Palestinian conflict would cost.'
treating, and distributing the contested groundwater is less expensive
for the Israelis than desalinating an equal flow of water would be.
However, "Sovereignty over the West Bank's water resources is an
essential part of the Palestinian's security conception." 8 If the
Palestinians had more water there might be less violence towards
Israel. Including some part of Israel's military and security budget in
the cost of using current levels of the contested groundwater is
therefore justified and might reveal desalinization and granting more
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water to the Palestinians to be the least expensive water supply
option for Israel.
Not only does the occupation of the Palestinian Territories
increase the true cost of water to Israelis, but Israeli use of water
antagonizes Palestinians-"drilling for the exclusive use of settlers
has in some cases caused neighboring wells to go dry."9 Even outside
of the settlements, Israeli per capita water use, high relative to
Palestinian water use, does not signal willingness to make concessions
to Palestinian water security.
Political uncertainties overall limit joint Israeli-Palestinian
management of water resources. Also, analysis of water-related
treaties shows "just how many of these treaties are based on an
incomplete understanding of the hydrology in question, and just how
often these misunderstandings lead to tense political standoffs."'
Any end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will involve water
agreements, perhaps via international law and right-to-water based
approaches. There are several reasons reaching an agreement on
water will be difficult. Political tensions are high, demographics are
changing, the government of Israel does not treat water as a central
issue, costs of water supply and reallocation action are high, droughts
cause problems, and water policies are seen as isolated from other
government policies. Reducing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will
require Israeli concessions to Palestinian needs for more water.

9. Id. at 205.
10. Medzini, supra note 3, at 203.

